Rubio’s Double Speak on Haiti and Nicaragua

People are in the street calling for the resignation of their president. The police are using excessive force; in the last three weeks at least 17 people have died in protests. Over the last 15 months of recurring demonstrations, close to 100 people have died. In November 2017, a government-affiliated gang massacred dozens of people in the home town of a leading opposition figure. This is not Nicaragua or Venezuela, but Haiti. The United States government steps up to the mic and says, what? 

Cue Marco Rubio:

That’s an internal matter for Haitians to decide. I don’t think it’s the proper job of the United States to call on a democratically elected leader to step down. That would be interference. Just like it would be wrong for the U.S. to step up and say he should stay.”

Before I write another word, I’d like to just note that this may be one of the few things Rubio has ever said that I agree with. It is just…how to say this…really hard to take seriously, especially coming from this guy. Earlier this year, Rubio threatened a coup d’etat against Maduro in Venezuela, saying of Maduro’s efforts to resist the U.S. installation of Juan Guaidó as interim leader:

“He’s picked a battle he can’t win,” Mr. Rubio, 47, said of Mr. Maduro in an interview on Friday. “It’s just a matter of time. The only thing we don’t know is how long it will take — and whether it will be peaceful or bloody.

Rubio also joined the chorus of neocons in the U.S. congress and their erstwhile “left” allies, in demanding Ortega’s ouster from Nicaragua’s presidency last year. Rubio was practically Trumpesque in use of Twitter, being very active but repeatedly getting reports wrong. E.g. His July 13 Tweet last year when he reported that “Ortega Thugs” were burning the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN). Buildings at the UNAN were set on fire that day – by opposition groups retreating into the UNAN after firing on an FSLN caravan (see pages 34-37 of linked article) taking part in the repligue (celebration of the Sandinista’s strategic retreat to Masaya in 1979 during the insurrection). Members of this opposition group shot and wounded 10 people. The resulting stand-off over night led to gunfire exchanged between police and opposition groups that had blockaded the university, some of whom had taken refuge in a church. The police response seemed excessive, at least as reported. But as was the case for most of last year’s international coverage of the crisis, what the police were actually responding to was never discussed. In the morning, most were allowed to leave the church. Once the area was cleared, stores of weapons were found on the campus, another detail rarely reported outside of Nicaragua. Certainly Rubio never got it right. Nevertheless he put Ortega “on notice,” and offered his support to opposition leaders (at least those wealthy and or connected enough to get to D.C.).

In Haiti, where Rubio has also applied pressure – pressure to cut ties with Venezuela and not to cut ties with Taiwan – all he can muster is some version of “not our fight.” The contrast is frustratingly familiar, but frustrating nonetheless. In reality, Moïse would not even be president were it not for U.S. interference in the election process in Haiti. 

The distinction Rubio would likely make is that Ortega and Maduro were not “democratically” elected. In fact, the only distinction between elections in Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela, all of which were subjected to heavy U.S. interference, is that in Haiti the “right guy” (i.e., the U.S.-backed candidate) won  – the same guy half the country is in the streets today trying to remove from power. The “right guy winning” is what “democratically-elected” means in the U.S. foreign policy lexicon. As far as electoral processes go, arguably Nicaragua and Venezuela’s elections were cleaner. Certainly the OAS statement on Nicaragua’s 2017 elections offered critique, but noted that the problem areas they identified would not have changed the outcome. Meanwhile, Haiti’s election had numerous procedural issues, and by the time the final election occurred, was largely boycotted.

In an ideal world, the protection of human rights would never be simply “an internal matter,” but a multilateral commitment with the force of international law. However, as it stands, human rights advocacy is practiced almost exclusively as an expression of institutional interests and partisan framing. Which means it is not about human rights at all, but the use of human rights in service to other agendas.

The never ending doublespeak from Rubio and other policymakers, agencies like the UN, and even some human rights organizations, ensures universal protection of human rights never happens. Ortega will never have to face a meaningful, objective panel to answer questions concerning possible crimes committed under his watch, because the U.S. has made sure no such place exists. And so, of course, neither will Moïse, much less Hernández in Honduras, or Donald Trump, whose human rights record is arguably the worst, given its global reach. 

The U.S. should NOT intervene, but in Haiti’s case the U.S. has never stopped – not since 1804. So Rubio’s words are simply more of the typical, vacuous phrases intended to deflect responsibility we have come to expect from U.S. policymakers. Rather than just yawn, however, we need to understand that the consequences of such posturing are significant.

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12 Families Receive Homes in San Marcos, Nicaragua

Members of housing cooperative in San Marcos with Institute staff

The following report is abridged from the Institute of John XXIII/Assocation Roncali’s report on completing the first phase of housing in San Marcos, Nicaragua. The Quixote Center’s Homes of Hope program was the principal funder of this housing initiative. We thank all of you who have supported the project thus far!

On Saturday, May 4, twelve families who are members of the Cooperativa Fuentes de Agua Viva (COVIAMFAV) of San Marcos were able to move into their new homes. “This is a miracle,” said Pastor Anibal Chavarria, president of COVIAMFAM. 

The cooperative was created in January 2014 and in 2015 was able to purchase land for up to 20 houses. Once in possession of the land, they searched tirelessly for financing, but were unable to find a bank willing to work with them. Several people resigned in frustration.

In January 2018 the Institute of John XXIII (Association Roncalli) began working with the members of the cooperative through mutual relationships developed years before with another housing cooperative:¨One day Don Nicolás (a director with the Institute of John XXIII) arrived in San Marcos to get to know the project. We are very grateful to him. The hand of God has always been with us, thanks to God, the Institute of John XXIII and their partners¨ Pastor Anibal Chavarria concluded.

The construction process with COVIAMFAV has been difficult. The terrain is very hilly so several improvements had to be carried out before starting the construction of the houses including creating terraces for the homes.

Kenneth García is an engineer working with the Institute and oversees all of the construction sites. Mr. García explained that he had to design a new model home that would meet the requirements of families. The result was the Sapphire model of 57m2, an austere and more economical model than the 42m2 model that was originally created for this project.

New homes in San Marcos

Terracing the land also required the construction of retaining walls. “The processes of construction of retention walls, in many cases was more expensive than the construction of houses,” explained Mr. García. 

Liliet López, another Institute engineer, who was in charge of the supervision of the work during the four months, stressed that the biggest obstacle was the topography of the land and the need to create varying levels for each lot. Engineer Lopez pointed out that with this project four contractors were employed, who had several squads of workers, for a total of 50 people employed during construction. Members of the cooperative also helped work on the project.

“We had 50 workers working from Monday to Saturday and days of mutual aid by members of the cooperative on Sundays”.

Of the 12 members who received their housing, 11 are women who struggle daily to get ahead with their family. Silvia Dávila, member who received her house, with tears in her eyes expressed her gratitude to the Institute of John XXIII (Roncalli Association) for believing in the cooperative and giving them the opportunity to have a decent home. “One of the things we learned in this project was patience and working together. We had the land, but not the money for housing. Thanks to the association our children will have their space. Most of us are women, heads of family. I longed to have my house, and today is the day they give us the key, the beginning was difficult, but God is just.”

“I am very grateful we have persevered” were the words of Martha Lucía Galeano, 38 years old, a member of the cooperative, who received her house and who has a bakery as a means of subsistence. “When I arrived, I listened to the desire to have a home and in this cooperative we were given space as working women”.

Another member who received her home was 39-year-old Jeaneth Bonilla. She expressed the happiness of receiving her home. “I come to thank God for this blessing and all those involved in this project, the cooperative and the Roncalli Association that helped us make this dream come true,” said Mrs. Jeaneth. 

On behalf of the Institute of John XXIII, Roncalli Association, the director Edwin Novoa, also expressed his satisfaction at the completion of these 12 homes. “All this work is the product of faith, will and relationships. It has been a collective work, which has required the will of public authorities and families. But we are still missing eight homes and we have the commitment to build them, this is just beginning .”

Edwin also encouraged the members to support the board of the cooperative and encouraged them to plant trees to give the soil consistency. Likewise, he recognized the engineers, construction masters and local authorities for all the support and effort.

Edwin Novoa hands keys to member of cooperative.

For the development of this project, the support of the mayor’s office of San Marcos was indispensable. Mayor Linda Tellez acknowledged the accompaniment provided by the Institute of John XXIII to the cooperative and thanked Pastor Aníbal for making the mayor participate in this project.

The celebration of the delivery of the homes concluded with the handing over of the keys to their home to the 12 members who were very happy.

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Homes of Hope Update

In 2014, the Quixote Center launched the “Homes of Hope” initiative in partnership with the Institute of John XXIII in Nicaragua. Since that time, we have delivered over $1 million to capitalize housing projects in Nicaragua and the campaign has raised nearly $1.6 million overall. 

The program is delivered through two inter-related initiatives managed by the Institute of John XXIII: The Community Housing Program and the Family Housing Program.

The Community Housing Program works with low-income families. Families are organized into housing cooperatives, typically with construction on larger plots of land serving multiple families. Quixote Center funds are used to cover construction costs. Repayment is based on concessional rates, and the money flows into a revolving loan fund that is used to cover costs of future housing projects.

To date 41 houses have been completed as part of the Community Housing Program: (20 in Leon, 21 in Sebeco) with another 12 nearly complete in San Marcos. Work on an additional 19 homes is underway and there are already plans for more in the pipeline.

The Family Housing Program works with middle-income families, a group often left out of local credit markets. This portion of the program is coordinated with a private bank (Banpro). Quixote Center contributions are used to secure mortgages: at least 20% of the value of homes is deposited with the bank. Banpro pays the full value of the housing construction, including indirect costs and administration up-front. As security for the mortgages is freed up with repayment, it also flows into the revolving loan fund.

To date, 53 houses have been built as part of the Family Housing Program. In 2018, however, this portion of the program has been in stasis, as banks in Nicaragua have ceased all mortgage lending, as a result of the economic crisis.

In March, we visited current construction sites in San Marcos, San Dionisio, and Terrabona.

San Marcos

The Community Housing Program in San Marcos (Department of Carazo) is organized with the Cooperative “Fuentes de Agua Viva.” With support from the municipality, the cooperative secured 1 manzana (1.7 acres) of land which will eventually include 20 houses. The first phase of construction for 12 houses is nearly complete.

View of Housing Site, San Marco

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

San Dionisio

The Community Housing Program in San Dionisio (Department of Matagalpa) is being coordinated with the mayor’s office. The municipality was able to secure a large plot of land with support through the national government’s land initiative. The site will eventually hold 40 houses but the first phase includes plans for 12 homes. At the time of our visit, the entry to the property had been complete, with a communal space to house celebrations and a regular market for local producers. The rest of the site has yet to be cleared. In meeting with the mayor’s office, Institute staff discussed the path of the road through the property, and reached agreement on a modest re-routing. Clearing activities for the rest of the property will begin soon.

Market in San Dionisio

Future site of San Dionisio housing units

Terrabona

In Terrabona (Department of Matagalpa), the municipality has offered participation in the housing initiative to teachers as a benefit for their work. The Institute is coordinating construction of 7 homes for this program. During our time in Terrabona, the Institute began discussions with the mayor’s office about an additional site for a Community Housing Program that will hold 26 houses. As in San Dionisio, the property in Terabono was purchased by the mayor’s office with support from the national government. The mayor’s office is offering the land for sale at concessionary rates to families without permanent housing; repaid funds will then go to purchase additional land for future housing.

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Annual Report 2018

The Quixote Center’s Annual Report for 2018 is now available. If you like the work we are doing, please consider a tax-deductible contribution. You can designate funds to a specific program, or put it toward general funds that support all of our work. 

 

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A New Round of Dialogue Launches in Nicaragua

Representatives of the Nicaraguan government begin meetings with business leaders and other members of the opposition Civic Alliance starting today. Church leaders are present to witness the discussions, but unlike the dialogue attempted last year – where church leaders were “moderators” –  they have no formal role this time.

Last year’s rounds of dialogue were very public affairs, with plenaries held before cameras and smaller working sessions held in private. The new talks are being held completely in private; indeed the location of the talks has not been released. A small group, working together outside the temptation of live camera feeds, may be more likely to reach an agreement. On the other hand, there is also a danger that an agreement reached by this smaller gathering won’t be accepted by the myriad groups cut out of the talks.

Context for Discussions

Since the fighting ended in July, a sustainable peace has been hard to achieve. In July, the government passed an anti-terrorism law which has since been used as the basis for the arrest of hundreds of people involved in demonstrations last year. While there was certainly violence from opposition groups – a point largely ignored outside of Nicaragua – the scale of arrests seems out of proportion to those crimes. In some cases, the sentences handed out have been questionable*, far in excess of the constitutionally mandated maximum 30-year sentence, giving the whole process the feel of show trials meant to bolster Ortega’s authority rather than as an effort to achieve justice. That said, there were crimes committed and families clamoring for justice. Not all of the arrests can be dismissed as political posturing. Even so, the process to date has not inspired confidence and is being used outside of Nicaragua to legitimate further sanctions.

Meanwhile the economy has come undone. Nicaragua entered 2018 with economic growth projected at 4-5%. By the end of the year, the economy had actually shrunk; 150,000 jobs were lost (even more in the informal economy), and banks had sharply reduced new lending, creating the potential for a protracted recession. The immediate cause for this is the political crisis. Blockades erected during demonstrations stopped almost all commerce for the months of May to July. Tourism, which had become a major source of foreign exchange and represented 6% of GDP in 2017, collapsed. Over 800,000 reservations into Nicaragua were cancelled in 2018, leading to a 54% decline in revenue and widespread job loss. Foreign direct investment (FDI) took a huge hit as a result of the crisis. FDI fell to $10.7 million in the second quarter of 2018, its lowest level in years. By comparison, FDI in the second quarter of the previous year was $113 million. Capital flight passed the $1 billion mark in August, creating a liquidity crisis for banks. The Central Bank intervened with sales to banks from foreign reserves for a time, but the Central Bank was facing its own liquidity crisis given the falloff in international transactions. By the end of 2018, foreign exchange holdings had fallen to their lowest level in a decade.

On top of the broader economic problems, the threat of sanctions is freezing out investment and raising the costs of borrowing to the government. Nicaragua had already been hit by the secondary effects of new U.S. sanctions against Venezuela announced in August of 2017. Venezuela’s oil company PdVSA holds a 51% stake in Albanisa, a private holding company that uses a portion of proceeds from subsidized oil sales to invest in variety of energy projects. Under threat of sanctions, Albanisa was forced to transfer all of its funds from private banks in Nicaragua to the Banco Corporativo (Bancorp), which is also an Albanisa company. The U.S. congress passed the NICA Act in December, an immediate result of which was that U.S. banks began withdrawing services from Nicaragua for fear of being caught up in sanctions. The long-terms impact of the NICA Act could be devastating. If the U.S. were to veto any new agreement with the International Monetary Fund (as called for in the NICA Act), the ability of the government to borrow funds would be severely hampered.

What’s on the table

As the sides meet today, they will be hammering out an agenda and delineating the process for discussions. The government is clearly looking for a path out of the economic crisis, or at least an agreement that would forestall implementation of further sanctions from the U.S. and avoid sanctions threatened by the European Union. It is doubtful that a formal agreement on new tax policies and social security reform would even be on the table at this point. But positioning for those coming debates will certainly be an undercurrent in the discussions.

The Civic Alliance is coming with demands (as reported in El Nuevo Diario): Release of political prisoners and the restoration of freedoms, rights and guarantees, established by the Political Constitution, as well as electoral reforms that guarantee fair, free and transparent elections; and Justice for the people of Nicaragua. Not on this list is the specific demand for early elections. This may still be a part of the discussion, of course, but there is some light here. The government has committed, on paper at least, to introducing electoral reforms and has met some opposition demands on local election policy already. Last night the government prepared to release 120-150 prisoners to conditions of house arrest. This is far from the freedom being demanded, but might garner the government some small amount of goodwill on this point. As of this afternoon, the government has already begun to follow through and a partial list of those under house arrest has been made public. 

Whatever is decided at the dialogue faces at least two further challenges, a domestic one and an international one.

If the Civic Alliance members are seen as compromising too much to get an agreement, it might well be rejected on the streets. This is particularly true on the questions of prisoners and elections. The hardcore opposition wants Ortega gone, and will demand all prisoners released. The Civic Alliance negotiators are not likely to get either, but they may get a process to review arrests, with some additional people released to house arrest in the intervening period, and they may secure electoral reform that will provide more space for opposition candidates and, possibly, no fourth term for Ortega. Will that be enough?  

Then there is the so-called international community. Throughout the crisis, the U.S. government has been pressing for early elections. National Security Advisor John Bolton recently said that Ortega is on his way out, one way or another. Will this posturing from the sidelines make an agreement impossible to reach? Will the United States accept an agreement even if it does not meet all of their demands?

All of which is to say, I am hopeful that this process is underway again, and even hopeful that an agreement will be reached; but this hope is tempered somewhat knowing that any agreement will face further challenges to be seen as legitimate and to be implemented. Compromise has not been in the air much since last April, but maybe the economic situation, which impacts everyone (if not equally) will force the question. We can only watch from here – and hope Bolton stays out of the way, allowing Nicaraguan negotiators to come to an agreement without putting his thumb on the scale. 

 

 
*This was edited slightly following publication, from “In some cases, the sentences handed out have been laughable…” 
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Update on Temporary Protected Status: It will not end on July 22 for Haiti

There are currently four different legal challenges to Trump’s decision to suspend Temporary Protected Status for most countries. Developments in one particular case have ramifications for TPS holders from Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Sudan. We are working to ensure that this information gets out into communities affected as there continues to be much confusion about the timeframe.

We will continue to demand a permanent solution, one that offers a path to permanent residency and citizenship.

The following update is from Steve Forester, an attorney with the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti:

As a result of developments in the Ramos case, Haiti TPS WON’T end July 22!  It’ll go thru December at least, and no one who now has TPS needs to pay or do ANYTHING at all to benefit!  More good news: any Haitian who had TPS but doesn’t anymore because they didn’t reregister for it in either 2017 or 2018 may and should reregister now!  (But beware of rip-off artists: no one who now has TPS needs to pay anyone or do anything except show their employer a Fed Register Notice to be published in March extending TPS thru December!)

DETAILS OF THIS:  Due to TPS-related legal developments in the ongoing Ramos federal court case:

1)  TPS for Haitians will virtually certainly NOT end on July 22, 2019; the government in early March will automatically extend it to approximately January 1, 2020, and quite possibly will do so for another nine months beyond that date, to September, 2020; no one who properly re-registered for TPS needs to pay or do anything at all to benefit from this!

2)  Haitians with TPS who didn’t re-register for it in 2017 or 2018 out of fear, confusion, or another good reason can and should seek to reregister now; the gov’t has agreed to give such applications “presumptive weight” as being filed late for good cause—meaning they should be granted and then entitled to the TPS extensions described above/below!

More Details:

As you know, DHS’s November 2017 decision ending Haiti TPS, with an 18-month grace period set to expire on July 22, 2019, is being challenged in four federal district court suits, including the Ramos litigation in San Francisco. On October 3, 2018, Judge Chen in Ramos issued a preliminary injunction (“PI”) in the plaintiffs’ favor, blocking as unconstitutional, while the injunction remains in effect, implementation of DHS’s TPS termination decisions for Haiti, El Salvador, Sudan, and Nicaragua.

The U.S. government (“USG”) has appealed Judge Chen’s order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals but has agreed, while the court’s order is in effect, to certain important measures. These measures are reflected in an October 31 Federal Register Notice (“FRN”) (“Continuation of Documentation for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status Designations for Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador”) or in a declaration filed in Ramos by a high-ranking USG official.

These important protective measures include the following:

  • Automatic 9 month extensions, starting in April 2019, unless there is a loss at a court of appeals: “DHS will issue another Federal Register Notice approximately 30 days before April 2, 2019, that will extend TPS for an additional nine months from April 2, 2019, for all affected beneficiaries under the TPS designations for Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador.  DHS will continue to issue Federal Register Notices at nine-month intervals so long as the preliminary injunction remains in place and will continue its commitment to [an] orderly transition period, as described above.” (There’s no way the Ninth Circuit will decide by early March, much less the Supreme Court.  So the early March additional Federal Register Notice referenced above will issue.)
  • TPS work and legal status will be automatic for those registered—no need to pay for employment authorization cards or further registration:Under the agreement, for as long as the district court’s order is in place, people with TPS who have re-registered previously – or who re-register late – will not need to register again or apply for a new EAD. They can rely on their existing (to-be-expired) EAD or TPS approval notice, as well as the Federal Register Notice, as valid authorization to work or as proof of legal status in the United States. They do not need to pay any further money to the US government, and should not need to pay for additional legal assistance either.
  • Re-registration possible—and likely guaranteed—for people who did not re-register during the Trump Administration: Crucially, Haitians with TPS who didn’t reregister in 2017 or 2018 due to fear or other good reason can successfully do so now!  If they now reregister for TPS late for good cause, the USG will give their applications “presumptive weight” as being valid!  This means that any Haitian TPS recipient who failed to reregister in 2017 or 2018 should be successful in doing so now — late — if they explain that they didn’t reregister on time due to fear, confusion, or other good reason.  (This is extremely important for example for the estimated nearly 16,000 Haitians with TPS who let their TPS status lapse early this year by not trying to reregister!)
  • No new terminations for these countries for now: The USG will not try to write new TPS termination notices for Haiti or the three other nations while the court’s order remains valid.
  • At least 6 months additional protection even if there is a loss at a higher court: “In the event the preliminary injunction is reversed and that reversal becomes final, DHS will allow for an orderly transition period,” which effectively amounts to about six months from the date of any such hypothetical future final, non-appealable order. This means that – if the district court’s order is overturned on appeal (at the court of appeals or the Supreme Court), the earliest that TPS holders from these countries could lose their legal status is about 6 months after the appeals court’s decision.

Prompt congressional action for a longer-term solution remains key.  But please help spread this crucially important info for TPS’ers explained above in Haitian American communities! Haitians with TPS need to know they needn’t fear anything changing on July 22; and Haitians who used to have it but who failed to reregister for it under Trump need to know that they may and should reregister for it now to get its protections.

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NICA Act 2.0: It’s back and even worse than before

The Nicaragua Investment Conditionality Act has been floating around congress since 2015. The main idea behind the bill is to direct the U.S. Executive Branch to use its voting power in multilateral lending institutions to block any new loans for Nicaragua until a set of reforms regarding elections and transparency is implemented.

The latest version of the bill passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in October of 2017. A companion bill was then introduced into the Senate by Ted Cruz (R-TX). This Senate version (S. 2265) was similar to the House version, but added provisions for investigation into the activity of “other regimes” in Nicaragua – principally Venezuela and Russia. This version of the NICA Act was sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where it sat with no action until September of this year.

During the last week of September, NICA Act was given new life with a companion bill introduced by Robert Menendez (D-NJ), called the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Act of 2018 (S. 3233). The new bill was voted out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 26, and is heading for a floor debate some time soon. The twist is that Menendez’s original bill was fused with the NICA Act in this latest version, creating a broad set of sanctions that will impact Nicaragua’s access to international financial institutions while also punishing individuals in Nicaragua.

Specifically, the new bill:

  • Directs the Executive to use the influence of the U.S. government to oppose the extension of new loans or agreements with Nicaragua through the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund;
  • Calls for sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act – which allows the U.S. executive to seize assets of individuals from other countries it deems responsible for human rights abuse or political corruption, and also employ other sanctions;
  • Calls for restricting visas for travel to the United States to individuals in the Nicaraguan government and their associates;
  • Calls for annual reporting on the state of Nicaragua’s democracy;
  • Directs agencies to create a “civil society” engagement strategy – which in the current context largely means expanding support for groups in opposition to the government;
  • Is enacted until 2023, although provisions can be waived if Nicaragua adopts reforms that satisfy U.S. policy-makers.

If passed, the U.S. government will be committing itself to increased intervention that would do serious harm to Nicaragua’s economy – already reeling from a collapse in investment and capital flight. By incorporating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act the bill leaves the path open for the President to go even further than individual sanctions in punishing Nicaragua.

The Nicaragua Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Act of 2018 (S. 3233) is a bad idea. It goes much further than the original NICA Act, which we have opposed from the beginning. It has the potential of doing grave harm to the people of Nicaragua, and seems intent on deepening the polarization in the country at a time when the United States, if it is to do anything, should be limiting its role to encouraging dialogue (without imposing predetermined outcomes on the dialogue – as the U.S. has done thus far). This new bill will simply make it that much harder for groups to come together and reach a political settlement to the ongoing crisis.

You can call your Senators at the Capitol Hill Switchboard at (202) 224-3121. Tell them “No to sanctions” in S. 3233, and yes to encouraging a return to dialogue unencumbered by U.S. intervention!

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Daily Dispatch 8/25/18

A new series in which we (will aspire to) offer a sampling of today’s headlines on immigration, race, and related stories.

August 25, 2018

Saturday Edition

 

Top Story:

Trump administration officials are meeting weekly at CBP headquarters in DC to draft new plans for separating families and/or detaining them indefinitely – but in a way that avoids the recent PR disaster at the border. “We need to be smarter if we want to implement something on this scale,” is the attitude of officials, implying that it was not the policy itself but the incompetence of the roll-out that caused the public backlash. Because these are preliminary, officials have been instructed to disregard current laws and protections (yikes) as they develop proposals. Asked if the negative public reaction to this summer’s round of family separations surprised them, one current official said:

“The expectation was that the kids would go to the Office of Refugee Resettlement, that the parents would get deported, and that no one would care” (… yikes).

 

The Churches:

A New Yorker profile of a Pakistani family offered sanctuary in a Connecticut church, living in the church basement for 159 days now in an effort to avoid deportation.

TIME profiles Catholic Charities of the Rio Grande Humanitarian Respite Center, an organization in McAllen Texas that helps asylum families that have been released from ICE detention centers.

 

The Courts:

American Muslim woman files suit against CBP for seizing her iPhone and keeping it for 130 days without explanation.

Trump administration appeals Judge Sabraw’s injunction against family separation.

Emails reveal conflicts between federal agencies during intense debate over the terminations of Temporary Protected Status programs. The emails were obtained as part of a lawsuit to halt the termination of TPS for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Sudan.

 

The Policies:

A deeper dive on the proposed controversial rule-change that would expand the definition of “public charge” for determining eligibility of legal immigrants for citizenship.

 

The Talking Heads:

Bump corrects the record after FOX News host Tucker Carlson’s misleading rhetoric on immigration, crime, and federal prisons.

Conservatives have been quick to politicize the recent murder of an Iowa college student, with FOX News leading the charge. But even FOX’s own Geraldo Rivera is chastising the network for its coverage. “This is a murder story, not an immigration story,” Rivera demanded, adding “I’m begging you to have compassion and not brand this entire population by the deeds of this one person.”

 

 

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Lessons from Haiti: Another View on the Nicaraguan Crisis

Since April 18, the solidarity movement has been struggling over how to interpret events in Nicaragua and where to push in terms of advocacy and/or speaking out. As with many people following the situation, I have watched and listened to friends take a harsh line towards one another and with me about articles I have written. While the division in the solidarity movement is not in and of itself new, the tensions have boiled over. The gulf between people over how the situation is understood and should be represented is enormous. There are even calls from some to support U.S. sanctions against the government of Nicaragua, and to expand U.S. pressure on Ortega and the FSLN to step down. My sense is that we must resist this push for U.S. intervention; the potential consequences are dire.

For myself, the ghost hovering over my understanding of what is going in Nicaragua, and more to the point, my fear for the future, is not Venezuela or Syria, but Haiti in 2004. At the time, the solidarity community was deeply divided over Aristide’s rule. His effort to craft an institutionalized party (Fanmi Lavalas) from the Lavalas movement had created divisions within that movement; his embrace of some neo-liberal policy reforms, accusations of corruption, and accusations of political violence employed against opponents resulted in many on the left moving into an oppositional position against Aristide. As with Nicaragua today, much of this division was in response to division within Haiti. Groups like Batay Ouvriye and the Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif (PAPDA), all with deep ties to solidarity groups in the U.S., began denouncing Aristide and even calling for his resignation. This sounds all too familiar.

In late 2003 and early 2004, armed groups began moving from the Dominican Republic into Haiti, burning police stations and public facilities. As these groups approached Port-au-Prince, the business community was organized into the “Democratic Convergence” with other sectors of civil society, and stepped up their long-time opposition and expanded protests. On February 29, 2004 Aristide was forced to leave Haiti. Escorted to an airfield by U.S. special forces, he was put on a plane to the Central African Republic. His claim that he was forced out of office at the point of a gun, was dismissed out of hand. There was no investigation. Many on the left accepted this de facto coup. Convinced of Aristide’s failings, they accepted at face value the claim that he resigned freely. What might come next seemed to worry them not at all.

There was no constitutional transfer of power. With the parliament inactive, the United States, Canada and France essentially handed off leadership to a transitional authority under Gerard Latortue, who had worked previously with the United Nations, and was working as a business consultant and talk radio host in Boca Raton, Florida, when appointed as Prime Minister. The U.S. military was dispatched to “stabilize” the situation, eventually handing over occupation to a United Nations peacekeeping mission in the fall of 2004. Though officially ended last year, a smaller “follow-up” mission continues to be a presence in Haiti 14 years later.

Between Aristide’s removal from power and Preval’s re-election in February of 2006, thousands of people died. The international “community” which had denied access to funding to President Preval during his first term, and later Aristide, opened the the aid floodgates for Latortue. Billions of dollars flowed into the country, which, to this day, are largely unaccounted for. Concessions were granted to corporations for large swathes of Haiti’s resources. It was corruption on scale that dwarfed anything Aristide had been accused of (much less proven), all coupled with political violence on a scale that rivaled (and, by some measures, surpassed) the coup regime of 1991-1994.

The solidarity community in the United States with ties to Haiti was deeply divided – a division that, whatever else was on the table, constantly came back to the question of Aristide’s rule and his future. It is hard to know what might have been achieved otherwise, but ultimately there was no effective voice to push back against the United States’ propping up of Latortue amidst widespread violence and intensified neo-liberalization. People allied in the anti-Aristide camp, would point to violence by armed groups nominally aligned with Lavalas to justify and ignore the broader destruction taking place.

Since April 18 of this year, I have had a strong feeling of deja vu. Obviously there are enormous differences between Haiti and Nicaragua. The FSLN is deeply entrenched in the economic, social and political life of Nicaragua, in a way that Fanmi Lavalas was never able to achieve in Haiti. Nicaragua’s democratic institutions are more deeply embedded, and even if one accepts the worst about Ortega’s machinations, there is a baseline of stability in Nicaragua that Haiti, under constant intervention from the United States, has not been able to achieve.

On the one hand, this means that Nicaragua is able to resist intervention to a greater degree. This is evident whether one accepts the “coup has been defeated” narrative, or the “government remains intransigent” narrative, as both interpretations speak to the resilience of the state in the face of external pressure.

On the other hand, if Ortega is ultimately forced from power, what comes next could be accompanied by even greater bloodshed, given the embeddedness of the FSLN. I am convinced that there is no way Ortega’s resignation, or even early elections, will satisfy the United States and those in the opposition who have aligned with U.S. policy-makers in the long-term. Why? Because the FSLN will remain the largest, most stable party in Nicaragua even without Ortega. Indeed, even if Ortega were to resign, unless the constitution is simply thrown out the window, a Sandinista will replace him, as his replacement would be left to the National Assembly to choose. If early elections are held, the FSLN will very likely win a large portion of seats in the assembly, if not a majority – and possibly the presidency – depending on who runs. None of this will be acceptable to the United States and allied forces in Nicaragua.

What happened in Haiti is also instructive about the future of the FSLN under U.S.-brokered regime change. In the wake of Aristide’s “resignation,” the United States transformed the political arena, defended the pillaging of the economy, and practically destroyed Fanmi Lavalas (ironically by trying to take it over in an absurd effort to clear the way for Marc Bazan – a long-time opponent of Lavalas – to run as the Fanmi Lavalas candidate in 2006). Preval’s return to power at the head of the Lespwa coalition in 2006, despite all of the U.S.’s efforts, would mark the last “free” election in Haiti. In 2010, amidst the aftershocks of the earthquake, the vote was simply discarded. The U.S.-supported candidate, Martelly, was put into a runoff in place of the Lespwa candidate who had actually received more votes in the first round. With this decision made under unrelenting pressure and threats of sanctions from the U.S. government, Martelly would go on to win, amidst widespread abstention. Lavalas was excluded entirely from the election.

For those of us in the solidarity community, I suggest we take seriously the hard-earned lessons of the Haitian example in 2004. Calling for accountability regarding the violence in Nicaragua, both from state forces and armed groups aligned with the opposition, is important; but I would emphasize that this accountability should come through domestic channels or the multilateral forums that Nicaragua participates in. This week, the government has invited the United Nations, the Vatican and members of the European Human Rights community to help mediate a new, expanded round of national dialogue. This has the potential for achieving an accounting of what has transpired, and creating a path toward resolution and reconciliation.

Continuing to call for Ortega’s removal from power, and inviting further intervention from the United States in the form of sanctions that would only further destabilize and polarize the situation in Nicaragua, seems like a really bad idea. Marco Rubio, who has led the right-wing charge against the FSLN in the Senate, has even spoken of the possibility of war in Nicaragua, and has tried to recast the crisis as a national security issue for the United States. Rubio and his partners in Congress make strange allies for those on the left, and they are certainly not the allies of the majority of people in Nicaragua. Those with such a policy orientation have no track record of bringing democracy to any part of the world. Nor, clearly, is that their intention.

As the violence on the ground in Nicaragua has subsided dramatically over the last two weeks, there is space for a conversation about long-term political solutions. We should welcome and support this opening. But inviting alliances with those on the political right in the United States, which has long sought to dismantle the Sandinista government, is about the worst thing that could be done for Nicaragua.

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Inspirational and Influential Women of the World: Dolly Pomerleau Part II

Dolly Pomerleau was one of the pioneers who founded the Quixote Center in 1975. She and Bill Callahan launched this justice work with a strong commitment to social justice in both civil society and within the Catholic Church. In both arenas, that justice included changing structures to establish the equality of women and men. Dolly was utterly committed to that and all the other projects and ideals to which the Center committed itself over the years. 

She was a Co-Director of the Center from the start… shaping the vision and helping launch many different projects. From the beginning, she advocated feminist ideals and full gender equality, making sure these values were a part of every aspect of life at the Center. 

And in 1975, she was one of the pioneering women who founded the Women’s Ordination Conference (WOC), the organization that has been a leader in the quest for women’s equality in the Roman Catholic Church for more than 40 years. The Quixote Center has long worked in coalition with WOC.  

Over the years, Dolly worked on a variety of projects at the Quixote Center, including Catholics Speak Out, which emphasized the crying need for gender equality and an expanded role for lay decision-making in the Church.

Photo from The Catholic Connection, October 1976.

She is a strong advocate for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), and was one of several women who chained themselves to the front door of the Republican National Committee when that party took the ERA out of its platform. The group was there for a full day in the hot sun, attracting a wide range of onlookers, including Republican women inside the building, many of whom were at their windows, pointedly expressing support for the action with hand signals, flag waving, and the like. 

Dolly is also committed to rectifying injustices of any kind where her actions might make a difference. She protested US attempts to overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the 1980’s, helping to establish the Quest for Peace project, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian aid for Nicaragua over the years. This meant filling many cargo containers of aid that were shipped to that country regularly and sent to the Center’s partner organization, the Institute of John XXIII in Managua. The Institute then distributed the aid to the neediest parts of Nicaragua.  

Several times, Dolly visited that country and travelled with Ketxu Amezua of the Institute to see the many and impressive projects that were underway as a result of help from the Quixote Center. Her fluency in Spanish was an enormous help in all this work. 

In the United States, Dolly was never shy about protesting US policy in Nicaragua, and one time was arrested in the rotunda of the US Capitol as part of a group that was kneeling to pray for an end to US actions against the Nicaraguan government. 

She also advocated for justice in Haiti when Aristide was the duly elected President, and she helped establish a new project at the Center called Haiti Reborn. 

Her values were broad. When some new staff people at the Quixote Center – Jane Henderson and Shari Silberstein – suggested a project aimed at ending the death penalty, Dolly (and the staff) endorsed it heartily. This project eventually spun off from the Center to become Equal Justice USA. 

And oh yes… Dolly is a native of the state of Maine – northern Maine near the Canadian border. Thus she is tri-lingual: English, French, and Spanish.   

Dolly has been a strong and fearless advocate for justice in both church and civil society. She may be retiring from the Quixote Center, but her words and her spirit will never retire! She will always be there! 

Maureen Fiedler

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Contact Us

  • Quixote Center
    7307 Baltimore Ave.
    Ste 214
    College Park, MD 20740
  • Office: 301-699-0042
    Email: info@quixote.org

Direction to office:

For driving: From Baltimore Ave (Route 1) towards University of Maryland, turn right onto Hartwick Rd. Turn immediate right in the office complex.

Look for building 7307. We are located on the 2nd floor.

For public transportation: We are located near the College Park metro station (green line)